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“…for an opening is relative to a ‘surrounding plenitude.’”1 
“The gallery is the labyrinth which includes in itself its own exits: we 
have never come upon it as upon a particular case of experience—that 
which Husserl believes he is describing.”2 
 
 Metaphysics—the entire history of metaphysics has been 
considered as the metaphysics of presence—is closed; it is closed like 
a dead end. In its “surrounding plenitude” no exit can be found and it 
is meeting its own death. Though a system of philosophy with 
incompleteness is not a perfect theory, but the rebuke of how 
comprehensive and close a philosophy is and the demand of that 
philosophy to open its house to the alien and the ungraspable would be 
a preposterous importunity. However, upon the stage where the entire 
history of Western philosophy has been played, “…nothing is staged 
or displayed theatrically. Rather, the battle of the new gods against the 
old is being fought” (Heidegger 22). This battle, between the new gods 
and the old, between the new thoughts and the old, is a battle of 
breaking into new ruptures and finding new openings in the old 
thoughts. At the moment when traditional philosophy has become a 
closure of the metaphysics of presence, even those streams of thought 
that already broke new phenomenological grounds in the beginning of 
twentieth century and Levinas’s ethical breaking are closed “as the 
self-presence in absolute knowledge” (Derrida 102, SP). Derrida states 
that we need an “un-heard-of” thought, far away from the system of 
presence and meaning, called “trace,” “différance” by Derrida. It is the 
movement before the formation of meaning that is continuously 
differing and deferring before the formation of presence. It is a 
perception that cannot be sensed (seen, heard, and touched) by oneself 
                                                 
1Jacques Derrida, “Violence and Metaphysics,” in Writing and Difference, Trans. 
Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 106; hereafter WD. 
2
Jacques Derrida, Speech and Phenomena, and Other Essays on Husserl's Theory of 
Signs. Trans. David B. Allison (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), 
104; hereafter SP. 
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in consciousness—it is un-seen, un-heard, and un-touched. Therefore, 
it “indicates a way out of the closure” (141, italics mine)—the closed 
circle of auto-affection of sensing (hearing) oneself and presentation. 
However can this “un-heard-of” thought indicate a way out? Can this 
thought open the closure of metaphysics? Is this thought of openness a 
different mode of thinking, pointing towards“…possibilities for a new 
kind of meditation?”3 
 
 To discuss these issues in Derrida’s writings, a close reading of 
the following texts is proposed—Speech and Phenomena (1973), 
“Violence and Metaphysics” (1964) in Writing and Difference (1978), 
Of Grammatology (1976), and “Différance” (1968) in Speech and 
Phenomena. The “difference,” the movement of traces, and the play of 
differences, for their structural commonality in endless references, will 
be provisionally called “open structure.”4 
 
The way in which an open structure operates is through trace, 
writing, différance, and supplement. They are open to the difference 
with another trace, to another supplement, to the substitution, to the 
effacement of every trace and supplement, and to the postponement of 
deferral. The tracing/erasing of traces and the seeking of the next 
                                                 
3David B. Allison in his “Translator’s Introduction” of Speech and Phenomena 
writes that deconstruction is not as negative as “destruction” in the context of 
Nietzsche or Heidegger. Deconstruction has no intention to overthrow or overcome 
metaphysics, instead, it sets its task to “…set forth the possibilities for a new kind of 
meditation, one no longer founded on the metaphysics of presence” (See page xxxiii 
footnote).  
However, it is always necessary to remember to switch one’s perspectives. From one 
perspective, deconstruction indeed presents us a possibility to think differently other 
than the metaphysics of presence. From the other perspective, however, this different 
thinking, this is to say, trace, différance, writing, and supplement, with its powerless 
“power” of spreading everywhere and encompassing everything, including the 
possibility of thinking differently other than deconstruction, itself has no possibility 
for “a new kind of meditation,” one is no longer on the structure of deconstruction.  
4Open is questioned in several ways. First, the question “How does différance open 
words, concepts, and categories?” concerns the opening of the horizon of 
metaphysics, the reduced pure expression, and ideal meaning, as Derrida discussed 
in Speech and Phenomena, essays on Husserl and phenomenology. Secondly, we 
might ask, “Do ‘open,’ ‘outside,’ and ‘the way out’ remain on the metaphysical level 
and upon that level, are they the ‘absolute, ideal, and perfect open?’” This question 
without doubt takes the same position with Derrida’s critique of Levinas in the essay 
“Violence and Metaphysics,” in which Derrida emphasizes that the other must not be 
an absolute and conceptual “other,” rather, it is before every concept, and thereby it 
is before the level of metaphysics. Without a doubt, for Derrida, open is not a “solid” 
open—it is not solid as Husserl’s perfect ideality and Levinas’s absolute open; on the 
contrary, Derrida will never speak of this “open” “the perfect open,” “the pure 
open,” “the absolute open,” or “the totally-open.” 
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supplement for the current one are the structures of open. We could 
say a trace traces and erases/effaces itself: trace traces and writes with 
erasing and effacing and at the same time, it erases and effaces with 
tracing and writing. Open lies in the very erasing, writing, and 
deferring. In other words, open lies in the very moment—let us still 
use “moment” as an expedient—that is about to remove, to write, and 
to defer. This “moment” of “about,” is always deferring, about to 
defer, or about to defer the deferring. Open happens at the very 
moment when the trace is going to disorder the common time and the 
deferral is going to defer between traces and during the movement of 
supplements. In this sense, open means “allowing,” “permitting,” and 
“promise.” It allows and promises différance, the play of traces, and 
vice versa. From one supplement to another, open promises the 
freedom of substituting, erasing, and moving thus, endowing the 
openness of what is erasable and replaceable. Only in this condition, a 
supplement could be replaced by another supplement, and therefore, a 
chain of supplements becomes possible. On the one hand, in the 
circumstance of open traces, différance, and supplements happen, and 
vice versa. On the other hand, in the chain of supplements and the play 
between traces, open happens. It is this process of open that makes 
trace and supplement not stop at their own and become determinate 
and certain concept. Open maintains that trace is an interruption and a 
disorder of metaphysical order. By being always able to differing and 
deferring itself, open prevents the risk of being petrified and 
beingfixed into one certain trace or supplement.  
 
When open occurs between traces and supplements, it naturally 
means it is in certain limit. When open has the meaning of 
“unfolding,” it first means “folding” and “close.” A metaphor of an 
onion would help us. Imagine peeling an onion. To open and unfold an 
onion means to peel the onion. When we peel an onion’s layers, we 
see that inside a layer, there is another layer. We differentiate layers by 
other nearby layers. The process of erasing and detaching layers is the 
process of opening and unfolding an onion. By the same token, 
supplying is always substituting one for another, playing is always one 
playing with others. This inter-trace, inter-supplement implies a finite 
opening and a certain close. Open is from one supplement to another 
assupplement can never occur without the other supplement. Thus, 
open cannot only mean pure, absolute, and infinite open, rather it is 
finite—it is in certain closure. Open is at work where and when traces 
trace and efface, supplements substitute, and both meaning in language 
and Being in beings arise and arrive at their limitation.  
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 Though trace, différance, and supplement condition words, 
concepts, and categories, they themselves are neither words nor 
concepts. They do not even cause words. They have no power to 
control, govern, or manage words. However, to say that trace is a 
“common root” for words, concepts, and categories does not mean that 
trace is a “root,” a substantial root, or an origin. Open and the 
openness of trace, too, are not a substantial root or origin. In the 
metaphor of peeling an onion, there is a notable and interesting fact: 
when one finishes peeling, the center of an onion is nothing. On facing 
the nothingness of the center, the metaphysical assertions on 
“concept,” “essence,” and its related question (“What is open?”) will 
turn out to be untenable to hold, for how can one give a “concept” 
before the formation of a concept, that is, before the play of traces? 
Prior to predicates, trace and différance escape the fate of being 
presence and metaphysics.  
 
 However, words and concepts are possible only by inscribing 
them into the movement of traces and differences. There are no words 
outside this structure of trace. As Derrida himself always states, 
“…there is nothing outside of the text,” and “…the gallery is the 
labyrinth which includes in itself its own exits” (Derrida 104).This 
open structure of différance is endless like the fabric of text and the 
labyrinth of the gallery. This structure of open spreads over 
everything, in other words, it includes all.  
 
No-thing can be outside of this structure—in this sense the 
open structure is closed. But at the same time, it is not closed because 
the structure of différance always expands everywhere. There is no 
“bound” of this structure and there is no frontier for différance. It 
never closes. But—again—it is never open. It is both open and 
closure; but at the same time, it is neither open nor closure. Moreover, 
it includes its own “exit,” includes the “outside,” therefore, “the 
outside is the inside,” and as a whole where there is no “outside” or 
“inside,” thus, “the outside is (with cross) the inside.” Is not this all-
including structure another kind of closure? Speaking from the 
perspective of the history of philosophy, does this structure not share 
the same essence of metaphysics with other (metaphysical) categories 
like Being and idea which attempt to grasp everything?  
 
Moreover, if the risk of misunderstanding arises, ask a question 
in Saussurean way: what makes trace a trace, temporization a 
temporization, and supplement a supplement? What are we talking 
about when we talk about trace, temporization, and Derrida’s other 
terms? When we are talking about trace and temporization, are we 
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really speaking of trace and temporization? Though from Derrida’s 
perspective, these questions would be nonsense, because there is no 
need to recognize them, no need to “be” trace, différance, and 
supplement. As Derrida writes, “The Being of the existent is not the 
absolute existent, nor the infinite existent, nor even the foundation of 
the existent in general” (WD 143).When trace disorders and deferral 
defers, trace and temporization enter into anunstable, uncertain, and 
disordered status. This status of instability, uncertainty, and disorder—
just as trace, différance, and supplement are endless—is endless. The 
web of différance maintains itself and prevails endlessly; accordingly, 
the status of this instability, uncertainty, and disorder maintains itself 
and prevails endlessly. Therefore, is this “disorder” another order of 
metaphysics, an order of disorder, an order as disorder, a disordered 
order—in one word, an order?, Though everything is tracing and 
erasing and is in an unstable condition in Derrida’s structure of 
différance, this structure as a whole, by maintaining and prevailing 
itself, achieves a stable and even a static status. From this holistic 
view, due to the unstable stability, deconstruction is never destruction.
5
 
 
 The first point for Derrida’s open—that it implies the 
dissolution of the center, of the central ideal, and positive meaning—is 
inspired by Ferdinand de Saussure. Derrida draws upon the key 
Saussurean insight, “…in language there are only differences.” Each 
word must refer to other words. The only connection in language 
system is the differential connection between words and it is 
“Arbitrary in that it actually has no natural connection with the 
signified” (Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, 68-69; italics 
mine). Saussure writes, 
 
 Everything that has been said up to this point boils down to 
this: in language there are only differences. Even more 
important: a difference generally implies positive terms 
between which the difference is set up; but in language there 
are only differences without positive terms. Whether we take 
the signified or the signifier, language has neither ideas nor 
                                                 
5
Many scholars have come up with the same conclusion: “Deconstruction is never 
destruction.” David B. Allison in his “Translator’s Introduction” of Speech and 
Phenomena states the similar idea. Cf. Speech and Phenomena xxxii and see my 
footnote 3.However, one must also notice that this same conclusion comes from 
different reasons. Behind the surface of same conclusion, my argument is distinctly 
different from other scholars’ arguments. In this paper, from a macroscopic point of 
view, deconstruction is found to have provided “supports” and “grounds” to 
metaphysics by removing its ground, and this move is another kind of protection for 
metaphysics, far from destroying it. Therefore, this is the reason behind my 
concluding that “deconstruction is never destruction.”  
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sounds that existed before the linguistic system, but only 
conceptual and phonic differences that have issued from the 
system. The idea of phonic substance that a sign contains is of 
less importance than the other signs that surround it. (120) 
  
There is no such thing called “the positive meaning” of each word. A 
word does not have a meaning of its own, rather, only through the 
differences between this word and other surrounding words is a word’s 
meaning determined. Referring to others, depending on others, and 
differing with others, make the word open to the “outside” of itself. 
The “outside” of a word is relative to this word itself; the “outside” 
here means other words.  
 
 Derrida in his “Différance” after citing Saussure points out, 
 
 The first consequence to be drawn from this is that the 
signified concept is never present in itself…Every concept is 
necessarily and essentially inscribed in a chain or a system, 
within which it refers to another and to other concepts, by the 
systematic play of differences. (SP 140) 
 
 It is the difference that operates in language and makes 
language possible, rather than positive meaning, the determined sound, 
or the absolute idea. However, difference itself is neither a word, nor 
concept, nor meaning; or to put it in the language of metaphysics, it is 
neither a substance, nor a subject, nor a predicate, nor being. 
Difference is not a concept, it is the condition for conceptuality; it is 
not even a “principle” as Saussure names his “differentiation 
principle.” It is just a “play” which Derrida names—the play of 
differences—différance.  
 
 Are difference and différance, by putting “positive meaning” in 
question and “indicating a way out (141, italics mine),” opening a 
certain closure? At this point, the answer is certainly yes. For the 
differences between words as well as différance—the play of 
differences—indicate an open place where one word can have 
meaning only via opening it and relating it with other words. The 
frontiers between allword disperse. A word cannot self-sufficiently 
own its plentitude of meaning. Counter to classical linguists’ 
assumption, there is neither presence of any signified “true” thing nor 
any natural connection between a word and its “ideal meaning.” There 
are only differences and references between words as well as rupture 
between word and its meaning. Among references and differences of 
words, open is shown as differences and ruptures. Beneath these 
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demonstrations of differences and ruptures, open implies an 
incomplete and deficient “self-sufficiency.” In other words, open 
implies a disillusion of “self-sufficiency,” a disillusion of an ideal 
status not only for the signified present of classical linguistics, but also 
for Husserl’s “ideal meaning.”  
 
 Instead of speaking of complete and perfect “self-sufficiency,” 
Derrida comes up with “insufficient” to designate a fundamental lack 
that he also identifies as the original supplement. This fundamental 
lack of positive center accordingly means that the supplement to what 
was a lack is as fundamental as lack. With the lack of origin, or with 
the supplement of origin, Derrida can firstly, avoid asserting any full 
presence of a signified “positive meaning”—for once, if one only 
speaks the certain and determinate “positive meaning,” one actually 
says nothing but nonsense—“Différance is the non-full, non-simple 
‘origin’” (SP 141). Secondly, guided by this “non-full,” “non-simple 
origin,” the lack and consequently the supplement to the lack, he can 
avoid speaking of a plentitude, the plentitude as the ideal meaning in 
the Husserlian sense, or the plentitude in the sense of the “anti-
metaphysical” Other and exteriority in Levinas’s philosophy. 
 
 The breaking of the centric and positive meaning is the first 
step to open. This is the departure point from closure: not only the 
departure point for linguistic meaning, but for meaning in general, 
especially, ideal meaning and pure expression as they are understood 
in Husserl’s theory of ideal meaning. Husserl clearly indicates that the 
ideal meaning intention is indifferent to the fulfillment of the meaning 
intuition because whether or not there is any possible intuition is not 
the criteria for judging an assertion and the meaning intuition qua 
empirical experience is already reduced. He arrived at the conclusion 
that “truth is lacking.” Husserl notices two levels in expression which 
he distinguishes as “presentation of words” and “sense-giving act” 
(Logical Investigations 193). The former i.e. the presentation of 
expression, which is also called “appearance” of empirical expression, 
must be reduced; no one really cares about the presentation of the 
expression, what sound it likes, when and where it is expressed, and 
who expresses it—all these acts of expressing are vanishing. All of 
these belong to the domain of indication that must be bracketed and 
put aside. As Husserl writes, “My act of judging is a transient 
experience: it arises and passes away” (195). The opposite side of this 
transient experience, that is to say, what people really care about, is the 
meaning of the assertion: “But what my assertion asserts, the content 
that the three perpendiculars of a triangle intersect in a point, neither 
arises nor passes away. It is an identity in the strict sense, one and the 
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same geometrical truth” (195). It is easy to understand by using a self-
evident geometrical truth as an example. Moreover, the sentence will 
be understandable when this geometrical assertion is false, say, “…that 
the three perpendiculars of a triangle do not intersect in a point.” This 
apparently false and absurd assertion still makes sense, and its 
meaning, too, is still repeatable.  
 
In this situation, that is, in a false or absurd assertion its “truth” 
is lost. Putting this to the system of object-subject and a priori 
knowledge and logic, the wrong meaning can never be fulfilled and the 
false assertion can never be fulfilled with its correlative object. 
Meaning-intention here works emptily. Truth is lacking: 
   
 If “possibility” or “truth” is lacking, an assertion’s intention 
can only be carried out symbolically: it cannot derive any 
“fullness” from intuition or from the categorical functions 
performed on the latter, in which “fullness” value for 
knowledge consists. It then lacks, as one says, a “true,” a 
“genuine” meaning.6 (196) 
 
“Truth is lacking” because the content as truth is not necessary for 
expression, and the objectivity that is based on any real object is 
replaced by any ideal objectivity. Yet this “ideal” does not mean 
correctness and truth of expression; it does not correspond to true or 
false knowledge. 
 
There emerges an essential problem of phenomenology from 
“…the false assertion can express objectively.” Husserl can naturally 
and easily get the conclusion that “truth is lacking” in order to show 
and prove that phenomenology is indifferent to the real object, 
however, he unwittingly admits another presupposition: even though 
the content is false, there is no possible object to fulfill the intention of 
assertions, the objectivity of false expressions is always valid by 
judging according to our a priori knowledge and logic—sense. It is not 
only the lack of truth, but also the lack of sense; in fact, the place of 
truth—a place of a self-evident foundation—is merely replaced by 
sense: here, sense supplies truth. Whether or not having sense is the 
presupposition for phenomenological judgments—judgments such as 
“it is evident true,” or “it is false and absurd,” or “it is nonsense at all.” 
Beyond truth, Husserl finds sense as his foundation. In other words, in 
                                                 
6Edmund Husserl, “First Investigation,” in Logical Investigations, trans. J. N. 
Findlay (New York: Routledge, 2001), 196; Derrida also cited this passage in Speech 
and Phenomena, 97, however, to use for his own idea.  
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this lack of truth, there arises another foundation and presupposition: 
sense that is always there and is already in expressions, without any 
doubt. Because sense can traverse “sense-only” and “sense-related-
objects” it may or may not be fulfilled by real and possible objects but 
infact, it does not care about this fulfillment. At the same time when 
Husserl abandons truth, which “is lacking,” Derrida, standing on the 
opposite and using the same words, would argue the same conclusion 
to prove his idea by using the very same words from Husserl: the lack 
of the ultimate and the lack of the absolute presence. In addition, after 
the abandonment of truth, Husserl finds another presupposition 
regarding sense, and Derrida, again, would hold his position that sense 
qua truth, likewise truth, is lost. As Derrida says, “There is already 
sense in the first proposition…it only precedes truth as its anticipation” 
(SP 98). Truth is promised but it has not come yet.  
 
Now, this radical lack of sense, from which results the lack of 
foundation and origin, tears, ruptures, and holes open in the solid 
ground of phenomenology. To say it more radically, an assertion is 
judged by the relationship between sense and the object. By judging 
whether it is true or false one judges sense’s relationship with the 
object. For Derrida, no matter how radically Husserl denies assertion’s 
relation with the object, he is still using the criterion of the object, 
which, according to Derrida, is the norm of knowledge. The whole 
explanation of Husserl, though it touched on “truth is lacking,” 
seemingly steps backward to the object-subject relationship, and 
thereby, the whole analysis is still stuck in the domain of metaphysics.  
 
 Thus, according to Derrida, sense relates to words in exactly 
the same way in which object relates to words. The difference between 
the real object and sense is not as sharp as Husserl’s thought. If the 
intuition/corresponding object is lacking so is sense and vice versa, 
while if one fulfills intuition, one can also fulfill sense. By assessing 
whether an assertion has truth or not, one already relies on the criteria 
of the object and knowledge. As Derrida confirms, “Apparently 
independent from fulfilling intuitions, the ‘pure’ forms of signification, 
as ‘empty’ or cancelled sense, are always governed by the 
epistemological criterion of the relation with objects” (98). Therefore, 
without such a radical distinction between truth and sense, if truth is 
not necessary for phenomenological assertions, then sense, according 
to Derrida, is also not necessary either. Depending heavily upon 
knowledge or logic, sense can be lacking. Therefore, sense is lacking 
in the very beginning. And because sense is lacking, what is shown in 
speech is lacking; only the sign is left with its 
relation/reference/difference with other signs. When the foundation 
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qua sense is lacking fundamentally, the so called “secondary and 
derivative” sign, originally belonging to sense, comes to the place. If 
we understand by “outside” that a sign is not something that is added 
to the “insufficient,” then we can say more precisely that the sign 
taking the place of sense does not come from outside. The sufficient 
sense due to some reasons becomes insufficient. Sense is always 
something other than sense.  
 
In this understanding, sense and the sign are no longer 
distinguishable. This is why when sense is lacking, the sign can supply 
it immediately. To understand this as correctly as possible, one must 
try to accept that the integrity of sense is lacking and thus, sense is no 
longer sense, rather, it is sense in a supplementary way. What does this 
mean? Let us relate this to Derrida’s analysis of Rousseau’s 
Confession in Of Grammatology. When speaking of the issue of 
masturbation—Rousseau thinks it is a “model of vice habit”—Derrida 
and Rousseau have totally different ideas regarding the same. 
Compared to the “normal” sexual activity, Rousseau thinks 
masturbation is just a special case, just an assistant, and that the 
imagined presence of beauties is only an addition to the real presence. 
He will never think that this “harmless” “assistant” is rather “original,” 
more original so that it is in itself the subject, “corrupting” the 
integrity of the subject fundamentally. Derrida writes,  
 
 Affecting oneself by another presence, one corrupts oneself 
[makes oneself other] by oneself [on s’ altèresoi-même]. 
Rousseau neither wishes to think nor can think that this 
alteration does not simply happen to the self, that it is the self’s 
very origin. He must consider it a contingent evil coming from 
without to affect the integrity of the subject. (Of 
Grammatology 153, hereafter OG) 
 
For Derrida, the integrity of the subject and the ideality of sense are 
now put into question. Masturbation comes immediately because it is 
in the beginning of the so-called “Nature” and “origin.” This “evil 
habit” merges into, and then breaks the integrity of the subject and 
becomes a part of the subject in the very beginning, just as the sign 
mingles with and adulterates the ideality of sense. Sense itself makes it 
other, that is, the sign. Under this circumstance, auto-affection—both 
in the case of Rousseau and the case of speaking to oneself in solitary 
mental life—is not pure and perfect as Husserl and Rousseau would 
wish; it functions rather by the substitutive symbol of the presence. 
The presence presents itself as an illusion, a symbol for substituting 
the presence itself. In the process of auto-affection, pleasure is 
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satisfied immediately by imagining the absent present, because it is 
nothing but symbolic present, a substitution for the real presence. 
 
 On one hand the auto-affection could be possible and pleasure, 
could be immediate because of the substitution, but on the other hand, 
the coming of the immediate satisfaction implies the deferral of the 
true pleasure. For Derrida deferral means that pleasure is never 
coming. The never-coming pleasure is but the lack of pleasure. 
Therefore, pleasure, or sense, or presence, or “truth,” “is lacking.” 
 
 The enjoyment of the thing itself is thus undermined, in its act 
and in its essence, by frustration. One cannot therefore say that 
it has an essence or an act (eidos, ousia, energeia, etc.). 
Something promises itself as it escapes, gives itself as it moves 
away, and strictly speaking it cannot even be called presence. 
(Of Grammatology 154) 
 
The essence is the center, and the center (if there is such a thing) is 
non-center. To play with the thing itself is to play with its symbol, 
illusion, and the supplement. In other words, one plays with symbol, 
illusion, and substitution from the outset. The so-called “that 
dangerous supplement” is not dangerous at all; on the contrary, what is 
really “dangerous” is the presence, the thing itself, the pleasure in the 
full plentitude, the purest ideality, and the most perfect meaning, in 
which the true menace—death—is dwelling. Supplements protect 
people from the danger of exposureto the too-strong light of purity and 
plenitude and from the menace of death. According to Derrida, there 
must be no center, no pure meaning/sense; otherwise it would be 
death. By the same reason, Derrida writes, “Pleasure itself, without 
symbol or suppletory, that which would accord us (to) pure presence 
itself, if such a thing were possible, would be only another name for 
death” (155).Then he cites from Rousseau himself: “Enjoyment! Is 
such a thing made for man? Ah! If I had ever in my life tasted the 
delights of love even once in their plenitude, I do not imagine that my 
frail existence would have been sufficient for them, I would have been 
dead in the act” (155). 
 
 Once there is a thing that is in its plentitude, it would be death. 
And once there is a thing that is in its purity and absoluteness, it would 
be a dead thing. In order to endow the ideal and full meaning of “the 
I,” “I” have to be dead and in order to speak well the expression “I am 
alive,” I have to be dead because the pure-self-presence is the 
announcement for death. Therefore, I present, I die. This is why the 
beginning question “what is the sign” must be lacking, for the 
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sense/meaning is lacking and for the sign already substituted for sense. 
This metaphysical mode of questioning “what is x” has no answer but 
one, which is deludedly answered in Husserl’s pursuit of absolute and 
ideal knowledge. Under this circumstance, a closest closure occurs: 
 
 In this sense, within the metaphysics of presence, within 
philosophy as knowledge of the presence of the object, as the 
being-before-oneself of knowledge in consciousness, we 
believe, quite simply and literally, in absolute knowledge as the 
closure if not the end of history. And we believe that such a 
closure has taken place. (SP 102) 
 
A bit further, Derrida writes, “This history is closed when this infinite 
absolute appears to itself as its own death” (102). 
 
 In this way, sense—rather than the object—is asserted as a 
starting point of phenomenology. This foundation of phenomenology 
is taken away in Derrida’s interpretation of “sense is lacking.” To say 
that “truth is lacking” shows Husserl’s confidence in how 
phenomenology keeps away from empirical “blood and flesh” and 
only keeps its ideal unity of meaning. However, at the same time, 
Husserl also shows how heavily he depends on sense. Once Derrida 
takes away sense from phenomenology, he takes away the foundation 
of phenomenology. Sense, and other synonyms of it: meaning, purity, 
ideality, universality, the absolute, the ultimate, and the full-presence, 
are closed. They are as closed as death.  
 
 Derrida in the end of Speech and Phenomena comes up with an 
“un-heard-of” thought. The openness of this “un-heard-of” thought 
concerns something beyond knowledge and beyond presence—
knowledge and presence are lack in the very beginning. When full-
presence dies—it dies “in the act”—supplements come.7 Supplement 
replacing sense/meaning/center/truth and thus breaking the foundation 
of metaphysics—the pure and full presence, ideal, and ultimate 
absoluteness—is Derrida’s open.  
 
 Lacking happens originally and the supplement is in the origin. 
If one denies the perfection of the purity, one can naturally avoid 
saying such as “the absolute open,” or “the absoluteness of the open.” 
These latter expressions are quite Levinasian. Therefore, the open, in 
this sense, by taking a lesson from Levinas, must be non-open.  
                                                 
7In Derrida’s corpus, Supplement has several names: “sign,” “trace,” “writing,” and 
“différance.” 
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 In “Violence and Metaphysics,” Levinas’s presupposition is, as 
Derrida claims, that “there would be no interior difference, 
fundamental and autochthonous alterity within the ego” (WD 109). 
When Levinas does not want to accept the “inner-difference,” he 
naturally imagines a “pure ethics” that avoids violence. Derrida 
analyzes, “It is true that Ethics, in Levinas’s sense, is an Ethics without 
law and without concept, which maintains its non-violent purity only 
before being determined as concepts and laws” (111). The “purity” of 
something—this “something” could be “Ethics,” “exteriority,” 
“alterity,” as well as the “other”—and the rejection of the inner-
difference, inner-other, share the same logic as in Rousseau’s 
“problem” of masturbation: both neither wish “to think nor can think 
that this alternation does not simply happen to the self, that is the self’s 
very origin” (OG 153). 
 
Derrida concludes that phenomenology is the metaphysics of 
presence in which a closure takes place. Levinas’s way, by announcing 
an opening from totality (the synonym of closure for Levinas) via the 
absolute other and infinity, however, cannot be taken either. 
 
The open that Derrida seeks must occurs at a more “original” 
level where there is no “transcendence” or “beyond of,” where this 
open must be open within itself and so must confront its own closure. 
Open does not transcend closure, but rather, being closed itself is a 
way of being open. Therefore, Derrida seeks an open in a more 
“fundamental” way—“older”: older than categories and predicates, 
thus and accordingly, older than the concepts such as “pure open,” 
“closure,” “same,” “other,” etc. Derrida writes, 
 
 Either there is only the same, which can no longer even appear 
and be said, nor even exercise violence (pure infinity or 
finitude); or indeed there is the same and the other, and then 
the other cannot be the other—of the same—except by being 
the same (as itself: ego), and the same cannot be the same (as 
itself: ego) except by being the other’s other: alter ego. (WD 
128) 
 
 The same and the other, in fact, transcend and are beyond their 
own categories. To be precise about it, the same and the other diffuse 
in each other, thus there is no “pure same” against the other or “pure 
other” against the same, and thus you can no longer point out distinctly 
the boundary between “pure same” and “pure other.” The play of this 
dissemination of the same and the other is performed secretly behind 
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the stage, before they walk into stage lights and transform into clear 
shapes of concepts and categories. “Behind the stage” is not a stage, 
nor a ground at all, to use Derrida’s own words. It is in such a stage 
that the open has to be rooted and inscribed, so deeply, originally, and 
“fundamentally,” thus, open and the play between open and closure, 
cannot be open except by open qua closure, otherwise open cannot be 
open if there is nothing but openness, without the limit of the closure. 
Open, by taking this logic, has already undermined every concept and 
category. It is open qua closure, as well as closure qua open. This open 
takes place so deeply and so fundamentally that nothing can escape its 
open range, which is also as known as “closed” range.  
 
 Because open is not simply the opposite of Husserl’s closure, it 
is one that does not simply follow Levinas’s “absolute totality-absolute 
other” logic. As Derrida argues, the other must happen before being a 
concept, it must happen on the stage of pre-concepts, the stage of the 
verb “to be,” of the phrase “let it be,” and the stage of Being with its 
dissimulation, which in this context, the other and its dissimulation, 
the same. Open acts as closure and vice versa. For this dissimulation of 
open, it is but that of closure. Being, before concepts and categories, is 
itself just a play of differences from which concepts and categories 
arise. Derrida writes,  
 
 Now, Being is not simply a predicate of the existent, no more 
than it is the existent’s subject. If it is taken as essence or as 
existence (as Being-such or Being-there),if it is taken as copula 
or as position of existence, or, more profoundly and more 
originally, if it is taken as the unitary focal point of all these 
possibilities, then the Being of the existent does not belong to 
the realm of predication, because it is already implied in all 
predication in general, and makes predication possible. And it 
makes every synthetic or analytic judgment possible. It is 
beyond genre and categories… (136) 
 
 Being itself just “lets be.” One may wish to think that judgment 
is power and concepts and categories are powers to grasp things. Even 
though Being lets the concept remain a concept and the category be a 
category, and the judgment be a judgment, it itself has no power. 
Because it is before concept, the effort of trying to understand Being 
by concepts would be a vain attempt, and for the same reason, saying 
and asking the question “What is Being/différance?” would amount to 
“nonsense.” On this understanding, we can say that the same, open, 
and closure are neither concepts, nor categories, or judgments. The 
play of Being is the play of the other and the same, the play of open 
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and closure. How do they play? The other hides itself with the mask of 
the same; the open covers itself with the appearance of closure. They 
dissemble themselves.  
 
 Being lets it be, lets it be such and such things; because it is 
nothing. This is to say, it is never such and such a thing according to 
their preset categories and concepts in plenitude. Being is not the 
absoluteness of something. From the very “beginning”, non-plenitude, 
not perfect, and not absolute entail difference—different from itself 
and being the other of itself. : 
 
 If to understand Being is to be able to let be (that is, to respect 
Being in essence and existence, and to be responsible for one’s 
respect), then the understanding of Being always concerns 
alterity, and par excellence the alterity of the Other in all its 
originality: one can have to let be only that which one is 
not.(141) 
 
 To be different from itself or to be the other of itself is the 
structure of open. Difference is open, open to difference, to the alterity 
and the other within something itself, to the uncertainty and in 
determination. Open and closure have to be mingled and this mixing in 
certain sense is Heideggerian, having Heideggerian names like 
dissimulation, concealment, and the “very veiling of Being.” Being is 
open to itself that is different from itself; in other words, Being is open 
to itself that it is not itself: Being is against itself. As Derrida writes,  
 
 Therefore, the thought of Being, in its unveiling, is never 
foreign to a certain violence. That this thought always appears 
in difference, and that the same—thought (and) (of) Being—is 
never the identical, means first that Being is history, that Being 
dissimulates itself in its occurrence, and originally does 
violence to itself in order to be stated and in order to 
appear.(147) 
 
The absolute Being or the thought of Being as concept in its own 
plenitude is nothing but death. “A Being without violence would be a 
Being which would occur outside the existent: nothing, nonhistory, 
nonoccurrence, nonphenomenality” (147).This “outside the existent,” 
is the stage of pre-concept and pre-category, a stage where the open, 
the closure, the same, and the other occur. On this stage, open is 
originally open to differences.  
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 Up till now, in order to dislodge Derrida’s open, we have 
examined Derrida’s thoughts step by step from different perspectives. 
We started from Saussure then stopped by Husserl and Levinas. What 
can we know from the above discussion? When the infinite and 
repeatable ideality must be dissolved in differences, in both 
perspectives of logic and time, Husserl’s “ideal-meaning-truth” 
freedom for true or false assertions finds itself in the closures of 
knowledge. And by the same token, Levinas, though took the totally 
opposite track from Husserl, emphasizes on the absolute other that 
takes the same form of fatal “perfectionism.” In the perfect and pure 
Other there is no other but the same; in the motto “open to the other,” 
there is no open but only closure. 
 
 On the way to open, this dead and petrified perfectionism must 
be cleared up. Or we can choose another logic by asking: Is there any 
perfection, absoluteness, or plenitude? If there is any “open” in 
Derrida’s thought—first let us assume there is—then what does this 
open mean? Perhaps the thought of plenitude can tell us.  
 
 Derrida uses trace—neither substance nor concept—to counter 
the perfect “open.” This is to say, he uses more “fundamental” 
difference—différance—against absoluteness. In this “strange” 
structure of différance what should be present is always on its way 
“about to present.” By “on this way” I mean that it is always and never 
arrive sat completion, determination, and perfection. Perfect presence 
is always deferring its own arrival; once it arrives, it would be 
something other than itself like the imagined beauty in Rousseau’s 
Confession where the presence is the imagination of the presence of 
beauties. This open of différance, as both the temporal deferral and the 
logical difference, compose the general structure of the Human Being. 
This “defectiveness of oneself” gives us time and the possibility to 
live. One must not be totally identical with oneself (to avoid being 
dead) rather one must be the other of oneself, open to the difference of 
oneself. Moreover, one is always living in the deferral of death, and by 
this postponement, one can have time. Not only death, pleasure shares 
the same logic. The incomplete and defective pleasure keeps one alive; 
otherwise pleasure in plenitude belongs to the domain of death— “I 
would have been dead in the act.”  
 
One is same, but not identical with oneself; completely 
identical is plenitude. Derrida clearly writes in “Violence and 
Metaphysics” that “…an opening is relative to a ‘surrounding 
plenitude’” (WD 106).This “never in plenitude,” “undecided,” which 
is différance that is always already in the structure of other-than-itself 
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and in the structure of alterity, is open. Alterity is always already 
included: “If to understand Being is to be able to let be… then the 
understanding of Being always concerns alterity, and par excellence 
the alterity of the Other in all its originality: one can have to let be 
only that which one is not” (141). 
 
 For Derrida, the open is trace tracing, writing, and erasing, that 
is to say, trace opening to all other “things” other than itself. Open is 
also différance differing and deferring to the “thing” that is not itself. 
Thus, one can easily get to the “conclusion” that, for Derrida, open is 
just and exactly trace, différance, writing, and supplement. Is this true? 
Trace, différance, and writing, are never beings, concepts, and 
categories. Therefore, they do not exist; they are not. Because they are 
not beings, concepts, or categories, they have no power to control or 
govern beings, therefore they are not any totality or supreme form of 
beings. Because the pure and absolute other would be nothing but the 
same, the same logic works here: The mirroring or imaginary “pure” 
open would be nothing but closure. Therefore, our discussion about 
“Derrida’s open” is never an absolute open.  
 
Upon consideration of the above, the question arises that how 
did trace, différance, and writing work in order to be open? Trace, 
différance, and writing are the condition for words; and furthermore, 
the condition for consciousness, concepts as well as beings. And only 
upon this huge web of différance (and trace, writing), which indeed 
opens to differences and in determinations, beings are possible. There 
is no being outside of the web of differentiation. This web becomes 
all-including for it is the only possibility and condition for words, 
concepts, beings, as well as consciousness. An extraordinary metaphor 
in Derrida’s Speech and Phenomena, “The gallery is the labyrinth 
which includes in itself its own exits” (SP 104). Does not this mean 
that there is no way out of this “gallery”? Is that to say that there is no 
way out of this web? This is perhaps true, for Derrida clearly says this 
in Of Grammatology, “There is nothing outside of the text [there is no 
outside-text; iln’y a pas de hors-texte]” (OG 158). Text is a web of 
différance or play of differences, a web so secure that nothing can be 
possible without it. But at bottom it can provide nothing “secure” for it 
is groundless. Therefore, in this all-including web there is no way out. 
Moreover, we already know the reason; the exit is in itself. In this 
boundless web there is no outside—in this sense, it is not only “there is 
not outside of the text” but rather “there is no outside,” or in more 
precise words, in this boundless web, there is no possibility for the 
“outside.” To put it in Heideggerian expression is to say that it itself 
conceals the outside but here the implied meaning is rather theordinary 
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meaning of the word. In this sense, this web—the structure of 
différance—is neither open or closed, for it is both open and closed.  
 
 And this all-including web extends even beyond the field of 
signified presence of linguistic (differential) to the presence in general. 
This web becomes so protective because every presence in general in 
our every consciousness is involved and thus appears as substitution. 
How does Derrida make this transition? A passage in “Différance” 
cannot be ignored. At the beginning of his argument, Derrida indeed 
prudently limits his discussion to linguistics, where he talks about the 
signified presence. After engaging with Saussure’s principle of 
differentiation, Derrida draws his first consequence, “…that the 
signified concept is never present in itself, in an adequate presence that 
would refer only to itself” (SP 140). A little further, we can see that 
Derrida expands this to all signs in general: “As there is no presence 
before the semiological difference or outside it, we can extend what 
Saussure writes about language in sign in general” (141). “Signs in 
general” is involved into the web of différance: “…we shall designate 
by the term différance the movement by which language, or only code, 
any system, of reference in general, becomes ‘historically’ constituted 
as a fabric of differences” (141). In this web of linguistic differences, 
questions that have the syntax “what?” “what is,” “who is,” are not 
valid independently because the speaking subject is already inscribed 
in the differences of language. 
 
 However, this web is not just the web of language it is also a 
web for the presence in general. The passage that follows the analysis 
of language is very important for this expansion. What we discussed 
above—the signified presence and the presence in general—remain in 
the domain of language and the sign. Then what about the presence 
that is not in this domain? Does it still belong to presence and in turn, 
the structure of différance? Or the question would be precise if one 
asks it in a different way: Is this system of différance still suitable for 
other fields beyond language, for example, consciousness prior to 
language? Derrida has anticipated this sort of question. He writes,  
 
 We might be tempted by an objection: to be sure, the subject 
becomes a speaking subject only by dealing with the system of 
linguistic differences, or again, he becomes a signified subject 
(generally by speech or other signs) only by entering into the 
system of differences. In this sense, certainly, the speaking or 
signifying subject would not be self-present, insofar as he 
speaks or signifies, except for the play of linguistic or 
semiological difference. But can we not conceive of a presence 
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and self-presence of the subject before speech or its signs, a 
subject’s self-presence in a silent and intuitive consciousness? 
(146) 
 
 An answer to this question allows Derrida to expand the 
presence from the signified and concept to the presence in general. 
Thus, he expands the web of linguistic differences into différance, an 
all-including system and a condition for all presence, a gallery that has 
no bound and no outside, for it “…includes in itself its own exits.” 
This question shows itself as a question concerning consciousness: 
consciousness that is “before” language. As Derrida writes, “…such a 
question therefore supposes that prior to signs and outside them, and 
excluding every trace and différance, something such as consciousness 
is possible” (146-7). The question now is focused on whether or not 
consciousness can be presented by itself without referring to others. 
For Derrida, consciousness is always the consciousness of a 
“subjective existence in general,”(147)and since the subjective 
existence is involved in the question of the presence in general, and 
particularly, in the self-presence, so does consciousness. “Just as the 
category of subject is not and never has been conceivable without 
reference to presence as hypokeimenonorousia, etc., so the subject as 
consciousness has never been able to be evinced otherwise than as 
self-presence” (147). Consciousness, shown as self-presence, returns 
to Derrida’s discussion of presence and therefore, belongs to the web 
of différance, trace, that is, “the text.” 
 
 The process of Derrida’s analysis, from linguistic signs, 
presence in general, and consciousness as self-presence, to “the text” 
of trace/différance, is the process of the expansion of the domain of 
“the text.” “There is nothing outside of the text” (OG 158).This strong 
statement concludes that all kinds of presence, signified, concepts, the 
self-presence of consciousness, in one word, presence in general, have 
to be involved in “the text,” the strange structure of différance and 
supplement. In that the web of différance and the knots on the web—
the supplements—are all-including and boundless, this web is 
spreading endlessly so that everything is engaged indifférance as the 
substitution of différance. Therefore, according to this logic, what we 
get is because différance does not exist, and it just sends its 
relegates/representatives/proxies; there is nothing but supplements; 
there is nothing but text. The text itself is closed even though inside 
the text there are possibilities and necessities of opening onto 
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différance; and this closedness is not simply because of Derrida’s logic 
of open—logically defined by closedness.8 
 
 It is closed because “…there is nothing outside of the text.” In 
this specific example of Rousseau, Derrida defends this nothing-but-
text and the absence of the Nature and “real mother,” which is the 
natural consequence of nothing-but-text. He says:  
 
 There is nothing outside of the text [there is no outside-text; 
iln'y a pas de hors-texte]. And that is neither because Jean-
Jacques’ life, or the existence of Mamma or Thérèse 
themselves, is not of prime interest to us, nor because we have 
access to their so-called “real” existence only in the text and 
we have neither any means of altering this, nor any right to 
neglect this limitation. All reasons of this type would already 
be sufficient, to be sure, but there are more radical reasons. 
What we have tried to show by following the guiding line of 
the “dangerous supplement,” is that in what one calls the real 
life of these existences “of flesh and bone,” beyond and behind 
what one believes can be circumscribed as Rousseau’s text, 
there has never been anything but writing; there have never 
been anything but supplements, substitutive significations 
which could only come forth in a chain of differential 
references, the ‘real’ supervening, and being added only while 
taking on meaning from a trace and from an invocation of the 
supplement, etc. And thus to infinity, for we have read, in the 
text, that the absolute present, Nature, that which words like 
“real mother” name, have always already escaped, have never 
existed; that what opens meaning and language is writing as 
the disappearance of natural presence.(OG 158-9) 
 
 In this passage, what we can see is that there is nothing outside 
of the text because the real mother of Nature does not exist and also 
because, what we have is just supplement. Nature and “real mother” 
are purely absent, also, différance—the movement of traces—does not 
exist; what we have is just the supplement—the addition of what is 
absent. Because the absence is abyss and différance is groundlessness, 
supplements thus are a chain with infinite supplements.  
 
 This “adding” movement is the structure of différance, which it 
is always differing and deferring, and which it is always tracing, 
                                                 
8Cf. Derrida, “Violence and Metaphysics,” the analysis concerning the other and the 
same. 
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writing, and erasing. Everything is in the difference and deferral. From 
différance not only rises the unstable surface—supplement, word, the 
text, the “delegate, representative, and proxy,” (SP 152) but also rises 
the meaning of language by the adroit and clever balance game of 
différance. Therefore, what should be “abnormal” becomes “normal”; 
what is differed and deferred becomes substitution; disorder becomes 
an order as disorder, a disordered order, or to put it in one word, order. 
Supplement, trace, and the text, as difference and deferral between 
words, though unstable and disordered, fill the dictionary in complete 
and platitude. Derrida’s open and its closure are like a dictionary, 
being opened, and after it has been read, closed. 
 
 As Derrida emphasizes several times, “There is nothing outside 
of the text”; “The gallery is the labyrinth which includes in itself its 
own exit”; and in “Violence and Metaphysics,” he comments on 
Husserl, “Nothing can appear outside, the appurtenance to ‘my world’ 
for an ‘I am’” (WD 131). There is no outside. And thus, there is no 
“overcoming” of metaphysics” (Heidegger, the Question of Being and 
History 63).Derrida cannot agree with Heidegger who tries to use 
“dissemblance” and “disguise” as the concealment of the truth of 
Being and thus let the truth of Being be. Derrida calls this belief 
“Heideggerean hope” (SP 159). For Derrida, however, there is no such 
hope. He writes in Heidegger, the Question of Being and History,  
 
 …that there is no chance, that there will never be any chance 
for those who might think of metaphor as a disguise of thought 
or of the truth of being. There will never be any chance of 
undressing or stripping down this naked thinking of being 
which was never naked and never will be. (62) 
  
 If one really “undresses” the thinking of Being, according to 
Derrida, one will find nothing. Because this Being, as well as “real 
mother” and Nature for Rousseau, as well as the “truth of Being” for 
Heidegger, are from the outset absent, like the center of an onion.  
 
 This is quite a sad news for there is no hope, no outside, and no 
possibility of going out of this web. One might object this 
“impossibility of going to the outside” by taking up Derrida’s position 
of “aporia”—the relationship between possibility and impossibility. In 
this position, as Derrida addresses, the only possibility is nothing but 
impossibility. You can only forgive someone when this person is 
unforgivable; otherwise, when the misdeed is minor and this person is 
easily forgiven, you are forgiving nothing. “Forgiving, if it is possible, 
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can only come to be as impossible” (“A Certain Impossible Possibility 
of Saying the Event” 449). 
 
 The impossibility of forgiving is the possibility of it. Thereby 
the impossibility of going to the outside is exactly the possibility to go 
to the outside. This objection by using the logic of aporia flips over the 
possibility and impossibility of going to the outside: if one can get to 
the outside so easily, it is even not “getting out”, on the contrary, if it 
is an impossibility to get to the exit, then this is the possibility of going 
to the outside. Is not this logic the only logic: the logic of différance, 
the only logic of thinking? Via this logic, even the thinking of “the 
impossibility of going to the outside” involves in the web of 
différance. In the web of différance, any raised question or objection 
will just be a “part” of différance, a possibility of the impossibility. 
Therefore, in this structure of différance, there is no open. 
 
 Indeed, deconstruction is not destruction. It is just an inner 
“explosion” on the “root,” under the surface. Though the root and its 
stability are undermined by differing, deferring, tracing, and 
supplying, the surface is well-maintained. This is the strategy of 
deconstruction: digging deeply. Speaking metaphorically, this strategy 
jeopardizes the root of the tree of Western philosophy. However, the 
tree is still blooming, rather, this tree is even more flowery just 
because the root is removed by deconstruction so that no one can hurt 
its root fundamentally. By the name of deconstruction, metaphysics 
can never and will never be overcome or overthrown. In the huge and 
bottomless chess game, everything seems open and chaotic, in fact, it 
obeys the “rule” of trace. This web is boundless and groundless, 
needless to say, it does not exist and has no power and governs 
nothing. However, all things are all in it and cannot escape it. It is 
powerless but also powerful. No one can deny it and no one can resist 
it. There is no resistance for it because it will engulf resistance in its 
web and its game by revealing that there is no “enemy” to begin with. 
This web takes metaphysics apart not to destroy it but to protect it, 
therefore, no one can destroy it from its foundation. This is because of 
nothing but the fact that there is no foundation at all.  
  
 We must affirm it [différance]—in the sense that Nietzsche 
brings affirmation into play—with a certain laughter and with a certain 
dance (SP 159). This is true. For this aporia’s play of différance, 
boundless, and groundless, no outside and no overcoming, when it 
comes to denial, resistance, and objection, the play will laugh secretly 
and mock at any rejections, at their energy and impetuosity. 
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